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The debate about the relevance of values for the concept of a mental disorder has quite
a long history. In the light of newer insights into neuroscience and molecular biology
it is necessary to re-evaluate this issue. Since the medical model in previous decades
was more of a confession rather than evidence based, one could assume that it is—due
to scientific progress—currently becoming the one and only bedrock of psychiatry. This
article argues that this would be a misapprehension of the normative constitution of the
assessment of human behavior. The claim made here is twofold: First, whether something
is a mental disease can only be determined on the mental level. This is so because
we can only call behavior deviant by comparing it to non-deviant behavior, i.e., by using
norms regarding behavior. Second, from this it follows that psychiatric disorders cannot
be completely reduced to the physical level even if mental processes and states as such
might be completely reducible to brain functions.
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INTRODUCTION
In the course of the “molecular turn” (Rudnick, 2002) in psychi-
atry, researchers purport to “provide more objective diagnoses”
(Akil et al., 2010, p. 1581) with the help of biological mark-
ers. Our traditional diagnoses, they claim, are not only unhelpful
but actually a handicap for causal research (Holsboer, 2010, p.
1308). This is why “psychiatric disorders should be reclassified
as disorders of the (central) nervous system” (White et al., 2012,
p. 1). Even the neurosciences seem to have lost their leading
position and appear to have gotten diminished to merely heuris-
tic value since the “real” discoveries are to be expected on the
molecular level (Bickle, 2006). While the adherents of the disease
(or medical) model of mental1 disorder purport that psychia-
try is at least as value free as all the other sciences, critics claim
that psychiatry rests on norms and values over and above those
being present in, say, physics or chemistry, since it deals with
the mental, i.e., the experiences, emotions, and behaviors of per-
sons, and therefore always includes norms in respect to these
phenomena.
It would be trivial claiming that even the criteria for some-
thing being a brain defect rest on norms and that, hence,
the criteria for a mental disorder cannot be norm-independent
either because they rest upon brain defects. The claim made
here is twofold: First, whether something is a mental disor-
der can only be determined on the mental level. This is so
because we can only call a behavior deviant by comparing it
to non-deviant behavior, i.e., by using norms regarding behav-
ior, which simply are not applicable to neurons. The brain alone
1In the following I will use “mental,” “psychiatric,” and “psychological” dis-
order interchangeably. Likewise the term “behavior” is used as a placeholder
that stands for “experience, emotion, and behavior.”
cannot give us the evidence necessary 2. Second, from this it
follows that psychiatric disorders cannot be completely reduced
to the physical level, may it be neuronal or molecular. The
classification of something as a mental disorder cannot even
in principle be free of values and norms and can be “objec-
tive” only insofar as norms and values can be seen as objective.
This is the case even if mental processes and states might—in
principle as well—be completely reducible to brain functions.
Hence, for the sake of the argument I will take the latter for
granted: there is no behavior or experience, I assume, that does
not come from the brain, and there is nothing in the men-
tal realm that could not be reduced to the brain’s processes.
Nonetheless, whether a certain kind of behavior or experience
should be seen as disordered, is not reducible to the brain’s
functions.
Thomas Szasz once stated: “It is not by accident that, in all the
psychiatric literature, there is not a single account of voices that
command a schizophrenic to be especially kind to his wife” and
he continued, “[t]his is because being kind to one’s wife is not the
sort of behavior to which we want to assign a causal (psychiatric)
explanation” (Szasz, 2001, p. 300). Even if we are not devoted
adherents of Szasz, this quote should give us pause. There seems to
be something peculiar about behavior that is beyond purely phys-
ical explanation because the difference between, say, acting kindly
and unkindly can hardly be grasped in physical, non-normative
terms.
In this paper I neither intend to offer another definition of
mental disorder nor do I claim an incompleteness of some sort of
neuroscience. Above all, I want to stress at the very beginning that
2Imagine a neurologist tapping with her finger on your brain scan and telling
you “Oh, look, you were quite depressed last week.”
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I do not doubt the existence of mental disorders. If you have ever
seen a deeply depressed person, or a schizophrenic desperately
asserting his responsibility for the destruction of the WTC twin
towers, you will not have any doubt about the existence of mental
disorders. All I want to show is that mental disorders cannot be
determined in a purely physical way.
In the following section I will explain my claim that psychiatric
diseases are irreducible to the brain even if the mental as such
may in principle be reducible. In the main part of the paper I will
first show that psychiatry is embedded in several normative frames
of reference, and then refer to five particularly relevant norma-
tive dimensions of psychiatry. These are the concept of rationality,
moral assumptions, the notions of harm and distress, several cul-
tural norms and influences, and finally the relevance of—equally
normative—routes of explanation.
THE PHYSICAL FOUNDATION OF THE MENTAL
There is no behavior that does not arise from the brain. Neither
is there something like a Cartesian soul, nor is there full-fledged
mental causation. How can one nonetheless regard mental disor-
ders as irreducible to neurobiology? Doesn’t this look like wanting
to have one’s cake and eat it too? It might, at first glance, but things
are not that simple.
If biological psychiatry was nothing but an ideology, as some
authors claim (Cohen, 1993; Berger, 2001; McLaren, 2010), one
would just have to show the irreducibility on this level. But we do
not need to make such a principled assumption.
Let’s assume every single aspect of our mental and behav-
ioral life could be explained in purely physical terms. In this
case it could not only be shown that our brains, together with
our genetic endowment, are responsible for the way we are, but
also how this happens, and which mechanisms are involved in
producing this or that kind of thought or behavior. Let’s fur-
ther suppose the neurosciences could even explain the so-called
phenomenal qualities—the “what it is like” to see red or to be
depressed. Since what we call “mental disorder” is without doubt
part of people’s mental and behavioral lives, it would be expli-
cable in purely physical terms as well. So it seems. To give an
example: It would be possible to explain which of the brain’s
functions and properties make a person feel “depressed.” To
make the claim even stronger, let’s take for granted that envi-
ronmental influences, too, are explicable mechanistically and that
“[e]xploring the mechanisms of gene-environment interactions
for depression is not substantially different from understanding
how environmental toxins contribute to cancer or how diet influ-
ences cardiovascular diseases” as Thomas Insel and Remi Quirion
assume (Insel and Quirion, 2005, p. 2221). Would we be able to
determine what a mental disorder is by physical means alone? We
wouldn’t.
This is due to the fact that no behavior or inner feeling has a
sticker on it that reads “I’m a disorder!” We have to write those
stickers ourselves and attach them to certain feelings and behav-
iors. It is completely right when Matthew Broome and Paolo
Fusar-Poli write:
giving and asking of reasons that one suspects delusions, not in
viewing a brain scan or a genetic sequence. In other words, the
diagnosis of delusions is based on the observation of behavior that
violates accepted norms (e.g., of rationality for belief reports).”
(Broome and Fusar-Poli, 2012, p. 598)
In short, whether something is a mental disorder has to be eval-
uated, not be discovered. This seems to be a purely Szaszian
account, but it is not. According to Szasz, mental disorders are
evaluated on a normative basis and not, as it is the case with
physical diseases, discovered on the basis of functional or struc-
tural lesions. Psychiatric diagnoses “are driven by non-medical,
that is, economic, personal, legal, political, or social considera-
tions and incentives” (Szasz, 1994, p. 37). Up to this point I agree
with Szasz. But while he claims that mental illnesses cannot be
treated by medical means for this reason, I neither maintain this,
nor do I dispute their existence. His argument seems to be some-
thing like this: (i) only medically discoverable conditions can be
treated medically; (ii) mental illness is not medically discovered
but normatively evaluated; (iii) mental illness cannot be treated
medically. The argument fails because premise (i) is problematic.
If we reformulate it into “only physically based conditions can
be treated medically” the problem becomes obvious: Szasz con-
founds the epistemological and ontological side of the issue. All
that can be inferred from the fact that mental illness is evaluated
and not discovered is—at best—that there are no natural kinds
of mental illness. We draw the line between normal and allegedly
deviant behavior somewhat arbitrarily. But the question of how
we can and should categorize forms (and norms) of behavior is
different in kind from the further question of whether mental
disorders exist. The first one is an epistemological question, the
second one is ontological. Moreover, it is obvious that we can
even “treat” completely normal behavior. Psychological enhance-
ment gives the best evidence. This follows not at least from the
assumption that no behavior or experience can exist without a
brain producing it. Change the brain and you change the mind3.
While Szasz asserts mental illness does not exist because of its
evaluative nature, my weaker claim is that it will never be possi-
ble to determine in a purely physical way which of the countless
variants of behavior and thinking are disorders, even if we might
discover all the physical causes of each and every thought and
form of behavior one day. Hence, the irreducibility of mental dis-
orders is not due to the mind-brain problem. But where exactly
does the irreducibility come from? In the following section I will
give an outline of the main normative aspects that prevent mental
disorders from being explained purely physically.
NORMATIVE BEDROCKS OF MENTAL DISEASE
Stating that everything is normative insofar as we have to decide
what kind of evidence we want to count as proof for something
or what we are willing to accept as an explanation in science
would be trivial. It would not be very shocking to claim that,
e.g., neuroscientists have to use normative concepts such as the
3Paquette and colleagues put it the other way round: “Change the mind and
you change the brain” (Paquette et al., 2003). This is, of course, true as well,
but not because of some spooky sort of mental causation, but rather because
changing the mind just means changing the brain.
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“correct functioning” of certain brain areas. Nearly everything
in the world—including psychiatry—is normative in this sense.
A much more provocative claim is that psychiatry is guided by
social, moral, cultural and other norms. If this is true, and if it is
also true that these kinds of norms are relative to time and place,
then psychiatry cannot claim to know what a mental disease is “in
itself,” where normality ends and mental disorder begins. Again,
if the boundary between normality and mental disorder is a social
construction such that the question of whether a certain kind of
behavior is a disorder can only be judged against the background
of this very convention, then the “disorderness” of a condition
cannot be found on—and hence not be reduced to—the neuronal
level. Psychiatry would have to admit that it serves—to a certain
degree at least—not only the needs of patients but those of society
as well.
NORMATIVE FRAMES OF REFERENCE
Judgments of psychiatric disorder always need a background of
psychiatric order without which no diagnoses could be made. A
relatively easy way of finding such a background or “frame of
reference” is to take a set of diagnostic criteria and turn them
(back) into behavioral imperatives. Leising and colleagues have
made visible the normative assumptions inherent in the DSM-
IV criteria for personality disorders (PDs) in this way (Leising
et al., 2009). To give just one example: On the basis of criterion
one of Borderline and criteria seven and eight of Dependent PD
they formulated the underlying norm “be able to tolerate real and
imagined separation4.” If a person is not able to conform to this
and other social standards she may be a candidate for a PD. It may
be objected that this only refers to some single criteria while in the
case of, e.g., Borderline PD seven out of nine criteria have to be
met. This is true, of course. But what about the normativity of the
other criteria? What do “unstable and intense interpersonal rela-
tionships” (DSM-IV-TR, 301.38, 2), or an “unstable self-image”
(DSM-IV-TR, 301.38, 3) mean?
A principled objection against the normativity assumption
could go like this: The current diagnostic manuals are indeed
deeply misguided, but once we have found the real and appro-
priate criteria for psychiatric disorders, we will get rid of the
normativity problem. But again, on the basis of what background
or reference frame will such an ideal manual function? Since it is
always experience and behavior that have to be judged as patho-
logical, we will always have to draw on “average people” to tell
apart mental and/or behavioral deviance on the one hand and
“normality” on the other.
In particular, four such normative frames of reference can be
distinguished (cf. Leising et al., 2009 for the following)5.
(1) The personal values of a given diagnostician: In the absence
of a strong theoretical foundation it is more likely than not
4The original DSM-IV criteria are: 301.38 (1), “frantic efforts to avoid real
or imagined abandonment”; 301.6 (7), “urgently seeks another relationship
as a source of care and support when a close relationship ends”; 301.6 (8),
“is unrealistic preoccupied with fears of being left to take care of himself or
herself.”
5The following four frames of reference are oriented toward those of Leising
et al. (2009) but are not completely identical to them.
that the criteria follow the values and worldview of those who
establish them.
(2) Cultural expectations: Diagnoses might not primarily refer to
the person but to the mismatch between her patterns of cul-
turally primed behavior and the expectations of her current
social environment. For instance, western-style behavior of a
girl in rural areas of Turkey may become a candidate for a
PD. Conversely, rural Turkish behavior patterns may be seen
as an indicator of a psychiatric disorder in the west.
(3) Generalized assumptions about human nature: While it may
be possible to determine something like “normal function-
ing” of the body, e.g., in respect to heart, liver, or the
hormonal system, it is quite difficult, if not impossible, to
find universal human mental and behavioral patterns. Even
if there is a species-typical behavioral setup, it is questionable
whether the thresholds to pathological behavior and thinking
similarly follow species-typical patterns6.
(4) Harm and disturbance: What constitutes harm for one person
does not need to constitute harm for another. In partic-
ular, the thresholds to harm and the kinds of issues that
are regarded as harmful differ from one culture to another.
Therefore, harmfulness is always judged against the back-
ground of varying, contingent frameworks.
While these frames of reference are situated on a more general
level, Sadler and Fulford have indicated seven normative judg-
ments that are “nested” in the individual diagnostic act (Sadler
and Fulford, 2006, p. 171 f.). These concern:
(i) a match of the criterion’s semantic content against the
patient’s phenomenal clinical presentation;
(ii) a judgment by the examiner about the appropriate approach
to the solicitation of relevant data from a patient;
(iii) an examiner judgment about the prevailing sociocultural
norms relevant to a particular criterion;
(iv) an appraisal of the patient’s performance (behavior, interview
discourse) relevant to said sociocultural norms;
(v) a comparison between the patient’s performance and
the specific sociocultural norms in determining whether
the patient’s performance substantively deviates from
them;
(vi) the determination of whether such deviance is substan-
tive enough, qualitatively (e.g., idiosyncratic deviance, as in
“bizarre delusions”) or quantitatively (e.g., as in “excessive”
need for reassurance in dependent PD), to constitute psy-
chopathology; and, finally,
(vii) a judgment about whether the criterion-driven behavior and
experience is disvalued or for the worse.
Apart from the respective diagnostic manual the diagnostician in
a clinical setting cannot but make a whole range of normative
judgments in individual cases. It is in principle impossible to get
rid of this normative aspect of the task, even if the underlying
6This holds notwithstanding the assumption of a set of ubiquitous virtues
(courage, justice, humanity, temperance, wisdom, and transcendence) shared
in all cultures (Dahlsgaard et al., 2005).
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biological mechanisms of a particular behavior or experience
were completely known.
In the following I will discuss five normative dimensions that
are present in psychiatry to varying degrees. The first is “ratio-
nality,” the role of which is somewhat underestimated in the
discussion of the normative preconditions of psychiatry (sec-
tion Rationality); the second refers to the special case of PDs
which seem to be particularly dependent on moral expecta-
tions (section Morality); third, there is the problematic notion
of “harm and distress” that has already been mentioned above
(section Harm and Distress); fourth, we have to ask to what
extend the concept of psychiatric disorder is relative to differ-
ent cultural backgrounds (section Culture); the fifth normative
dimension pertains to the relativity of scientific explanatory
routes which are no less normative in character (section Routes of
Explanation).
RATIONALITY
Even though “irrationality” and corresponding terms are not
explicitly mentioned as criteria in the current versions of DSM or
ICD, Marie Crowe has pointed out that there are several features
to be found in the DSMwith which a person’s perception of reality
must be consistent in order for the person to be attributed with
rationality. These include notions such as “impairment in real-
ity testing,” “magical thinking,” “suspects without sufficient basis,
that others are exploiting, harming or deceiving him or her,” or
“worry about everyday, routine life circumstances” (Crowe, 2000,
p. 75). Yet, this does not say what kind of reality is at stake.
There are several concepts of rationality (Bunge, 2007),
two 7 of which are of particular interest in psychiatry: The first
one is theoretical or linguistic in nature (logical rationality) while
the second one is practical in the sense of means-end ratio-
nality (practical rationality). When someone concludes from (i)
human beings are mortal, and (ii) Socrates is a human being, that
(iii) Socrates is immortal, his theoretical rationality has failed.
If mental disorder could be characterized by a lack of theoreti-
cal rationality, things would be quite easy. Unfortunately, this is
not the case. A couple of years ago a study was conducted show-
ing schizophrenic people to be even more theoretically rational
than average persons (Owen et al., 2007). Practical rationality, on
the other hand, comes in degrees and is not always judged by
the same standards. If a person who has become convinced by
advertisement that a certain kind of caffeinated drink makes you
popular and henceforth consumes it for this reason, we would
probably attest a lack of practical rationality. If someone seeks
a cure for cancer in prayer, this would be (at least in the eyes
of many) a grave lack of practical rationality, too. Now think of
a person who washes her hands every 10min in order not to
catch an infection. There are, of course, other forms of practi-
cal non-rationality which leave hardly any doubt that something
must be wrong with a person. But we have to set the cut-off
ourselves, and there is no other way than doing this somewhat
arbitrarily.
7Bunge distinguishes seven concepts: conceptual, logical, methodological,
epistemological, ontological, and valuational rationality (Bunge, 2007, p.
117 f.).
The problem already begins with the assessment of capacity
and competence to make treatment choices. While it could be
argued that there is an objective way of assessing patients’ capac-
ity by testing their cognitive abilities to understand, retain and
weigh up information, it is often overlooked that this is accompa-
nied by a number of inherently normative judgments in clinical
practice (Banner, 2012). Hence, it is not only the capacity of the
patient that can be put into doubt, but also the way she makes
use of it. And this aspect, the way of using information, cannot
be assessed but on normative grounds. One of the most well-
known examples in this regard is anorexia nervosa, where patients
usually completely understand the relevant information and con-
sequences but nevertheless make choices that other people would
regard as problematic (see, e.g., Craigie, 2011).
The assessment of rationality in people’s choices is normative
in two respects. First, it is not always a precondition for recogniz-
ing the autonomy of a person; in some circumstances it is, in some
it is not. Let’s call this the “Switching-Standard-Thesis” (SST).
Second, and connected to the first, the threshold beyond which a
certain kind of irrational behavior can be seen as pathologic varies
considerably. Call this the “Switching-Threshold-Thesis” (STT).
The Switching-Standard-Thesis
According to SST the standard of rationality to which a person is
expected to conform is the higher, the more she is suspected of
having a psychiatric condition. As long as someone is regarded
as “normal” her decisions may completely unreasonable in the
eyes of others. As judge Lord Donaldson pointed out in an often
quoted decision, the “right of choice is not limited to decisions
which others might regard as sensible. It exists notwithstanding
that the reasons for making the choice are rational, irrational,
unknown or even non-existent” (Re “T”, 1992). In a similar
vein, Craig Edwards underscores that if someone ruins his rep-
utation due to mental illness he may end up having to undergo
involuntary psychiatric treatment, but if he does so without men-
tal problems, it is his own business and he will not experience
(strong) interventions (Edwards, 2009). While ordinary people
are allowed to make irrational decisions even in highly impor-
tant matters without being deemed incompetent (just think of
decisions regarding the termination of treatment), patients with
a suspected mental problem are at greater risk of being judged
incompetent because of the very same “irrationality” (Banner,
2012). It is, therefore, a matter of normative choice and not one
of objective judgment whether rationality is regarded as a com-
ponent of mental health or not. It is usually being judged on
normative grounds whether to examine someone’s rationality fur-
ther or not. If a mental disorder is suspected, we do; otherwise
we don’t. Irrationality is not the indicator of a mental problem.
The dependency relationship runs the other way round: a sus-
pected mental disorder is the reason why we take a closer look
at someone’s rationality and possibly regard a decision as irra-
tional and incompetent that we otherwise would have accepted as
competent.
The Switching-Threshold-Thesis
Here it is not asked whether someone’s rationality should be sub-
jected to deeper scrutiny or not, but whether irrational behavior
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should be seen as indicating a mental problem. We all constantly
behave irrationally in everyday life. It therefore has to be decided
whether the irrationality of a person should count as part of a
mental problem. Edwards lists a whole series of conditions such as
greed, jealousy, hatred, or racial prejudice that impair our ratio-
nality and that “are sometimes considered to negative impact our
well-being and that fall outside of our ability to control as rational
agents, yet are not usually considered mental illnesses” (Edwards,
2009, p. 80). The threshold of rationality beyond which someone
is being seen as having a psychiatric disorder is varying.
Both cases look very similar, and they indeed point to the same
problem from different angles. According to SST, a mental disor-
der is diagnosed first, and subsequently a standard of rationality
is applied that is higher than in everyday life. According to STT,
irrational behavior that is judged to be normal on the background
of one framework may be seen as indicating a mental disorder in
other cases. The assessment of rationality is deeply normative.
MORALITY
I should stress once more that my claim is not that all psychi-
atric disorders are moral in kind. What I do claim is, nevertheless,
that many conditions—or conditions in many circumstances—
at least involve (morally) normative elements and thus cannot be
purely value free, non-normative (objective) medical kinds. The
moral side of ascriptions of psychiatric disorders is most obvious
in Cluster B PDs. Louis Charland uses two arguments to show
this (Charland, 2006): The “argument from identification” and the
“argument from treatment.” According to the first one, Cluster B
disorders are identified in the DSM through explicit moral terms
and notions such as “lying,” “lack of empathy,” or “conning oth-
ers.” It would be hard to explain why a condition that is defined
this way should not be moral in nature. His second point is only
partly an argument on its own since it relies on the validity of
the first one. What he has in mind seems to be that there is an
important difference between, say, ceasing to be depressed on the
one hand and ceasing to be a liar on the other. The difference is
that the first case can be seen as a cure while the second case is
“tantamount to a moral conversion” (Charland, 2006, p. 122).
Possible counterarguments to this account are not far to seek.
First, one could argue that it is not the morally questionable
behavior as such that defines the disorder but the respective per-
son’s inability to change it, her irresponsiveness to reasons. Even if
this sounds comprehensible, on a closer look it becomes obvious
that an immutability criterion like this one only makes sense in
connection with a presupposed moral judgment. There is hardly
any person in the world that can change her character traits from
one moment or week to the other. Character traits which we
would not even think of as pathologic can be as “hardwired” as
a full-fledged “PD.” Think of a particularly polite and attentive
man who has become this way through his genetic endowment
and parental upbringing. Every morning he tells himself to be a
bit more selfish—but he just can’t help it. He cannot change his
style of behavior, but hardly anybody would suspect a psychiatric
problem here. Both character traits as well as dysfunctions cannot
be overcome just by choosing to do so. Second, the availability
of therapeutic help or treatment that could be seen as a distin-
guishing factor is not a good candidate criterion either. Edwards
emphasizes this pointedly when he states that the “need for, or
availability of, treatment does not make something an illness
any more than plastic surgery makes a crooked nose an illness”
(Edwards, 2009, p. 81). Third, neither are character and dysfunc-
tion discernible through underlying causes since wicked behavior
is equally due to internal and external biological influences and
environmental conditions as mental disorder is. With the appro-
priate chemicals (or even brainwashing methods) you can “treat”
grandma’s joy, little Johnny’s nosiness, or Martha’s politeness as
effectively as Bill’s full-fledged depression.
Edwards, who regards the concept of psychiatric disorder as
morally based, realizes this very tension. His way out is a cata-
logue of five criteria, each of which is necessary but not sufficient,
together with the assumption that there is genuine moral truth in
the world. His criteria, formulated as questions, are the following:
(a) Is the condition harmful for the person who has it? (b) Is there
any reason for legitimizing the condition as a character trait that
one can choose to develop or maintain? (c) Is the condition one
that can be discouraged through the inculcation of appropriate
moral values during childhood? (d) Will applying moral respon-
sibility to the condition help to uphold broader moral values in
one’s ethical system? (e) Can one have insight into the condition’s
effect upon oneself and if so, how difficult is it to take an active
role in seeking treatment for oneself? (Edwards, 2009, p. 83 f.)
As one can see, all five questions can indeed help only if they
have answers that are not themselves contestable and/or relative to
society, culture, and underlying moral creeds. With his reference
to ethical truths Edwards may at least avoid the lurking diag-
nostic arbitrariness, even if that makes psychiatric diagnostics no
less moral. Those however, who do not belief in objective moral
truths, are still lost in the wilderness of psychiatric relativity.
In a strictly religious society being an atheist may be seen as a
dysfunction of personhood; when our western societies still were
(regarded as) strictly heterosexual, homosexuality was regarded
as dysfunctional and, hence, a mental disorder; since productiv-
ity is highly valued in our busy and buzzing western societies,
lack of productivity has become a part of the definition of mental
disorders (Crowe, 2000, p. 73).
HARM AND DISTRESS
One could assume that harm is not a normative concept: if a
person suffers she suffers, period. In the context of psychiatric
diagnosis things are more complicated, however. A first cru-
cial point that illuminates the normativity of harm has been
emphasized by Fulford (2002). We just don’t realize the value-
ladenness of physical harm because most people regard, say, a
broken leg as something bad and painful. Values that are shared
by most people tend to hide themselves behind their common-
ness. When it comes to mental suffering our values diverge to a
certain degree. Hence, it is not that bodily diseases are value-free
whereas psychiatric disorders are value-laden. Both rest on nor-
mative assumptions. In one field we simply share them, in the
other we don’t. As Fulford writes:
“Thus, the criteria for good and bad heart functioning, for exam-
ple, paralleling ‘good strawberries,’ are largely settled and agreed
upon, and this is true by and large of all the areas with which
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(acute) bodily medicine is primarily concerned. By contrast, how-
ever, the areas with which psychiatry is primarily concerned—
emotion, desire, belief, motivation, sexuality and so forth—are all
areas in which our values, paralleling ‘good pictures,’ are highly
diverse.” (Fulford, 2011, p. 3 f.)
Themost prominent author to have included the concept of harm
in his theory of disorder is probably Wakefield. According to his
“harmful dysfunction analysis” (Wakefield, 1992) we first have a
function of a certain mechanism that turns into a dysfunction
if the mechanism does not properly perform the tasks it was
designed for by evolution; and if this dysfunction is furthermore
harmful for the respective person, then it becomes a disorder. It
is therefore not enough to state a (physical or mental) mecha-
nism’s dysfunction, since there are lots of dysfunctions that are
not seen as disorders8. On the other hand, we all experience many
harmful things in life without regarding them as mental disor-
ders. Harm, he rightly assumes, is a value concept because it is
relative to cultural assumptions. While this is plausible, turning
Wakefield’s idea upside-down is plausible, too: It may well be that
we first disvalue a condition as harmful and only then search—
and find—a mechanism of some sort that has a dysfunction of
some sort. This would only be impossible if we could have a look
into God’s (or the evolution’s) model kit.
But there are even more normative aspects in the notion of
harm. First, the harm criterion leaves open who has to judge
whether a person feels harm and distress enough and whether it
is pathologic in character. It is one thing to subjectively feel harm
and distress, quite another is to judge whether distress is patho-
logic, and, if it is recognized as potentially pathologic, what degree
someone’s suffering must reach in order to warrant a psychiatric
diagnosis. Second, particularly in the case of Cluster-B PDs it is
often the social environment, i.e., other people, who experience
harm due to the “patient’s” condition while he himself feels fine.
A successful, narcissistic person will probably feel no distress at
all while the people around him may suffer considerably. Third,
harm also can arise indirectly from one’s acts and with a tempo-
ral delay. If someone in a manic phase makes highly risky and
imprudent transactions, the “harm” will (a) be indirect because
not the condition itself is harmful or distressing but its conse-
quences may cause harm, (b) the harm caused may initially not
represent a problem for the person in question but for his spouse
or children, (c) whether a risky and imprudent financial trans-
action or its consequences should be seen as harmful is clearly
nothing we can read off some diagnostic manual. Financial losses
are to be judged economically, not medically. Even if the person
later deeply regrets what she has done, it remains unclear what
degree of regret will warrant a psychiatric diagnosis.
CULTURE
One of the most widely discussed issues in the philosophy of
psychiatry is the impact of cultural varieties on the concept of psy-
chiatric disorder. Do different cultures give rise to special forms
of disorder experience? Are there mental disorders that are due
8I am only mentioning Wakefield’s concept of “dysfunction” here without
having room for a discussion.
to particular socio-cultural frameworks? These and other ques-
tions have been disputed for a long time. There is one tradition
that takes cultural particularities into account. It is called the
“emic” approach. In contrast, the “etic” account tries to explain
human behavior independently of culture-specific features and
to find general, universal traits (for a more detailed explanation
of the terms see Morris et al., 1999). Even though human nature
has some universal characteristics, there are underlying culture-
relative assumptions that make the etic approach inappropriate
for psychiatry.
The various normative elements implicit in the assessment of
psychiatric disorder overlap, and much of what has been said
above about the concept of harm, moral frameworks, and even
the question of rationality could have its place in this section as
well. Therefore, what I am going to do in this section is only to
highlight the various cultural dimensions of psychiatry. These are
assumptions and mechanisms regarding the causes of mental dis-
order, the impact of culture on diagnosis, specific differences in
the individual experience of mental disorder, and last but not least
the evaluation of behavior from the third-person perspective.
Causes
Culture or the character of a given society seems to influence
the development and understanding of psychic problems both
directly and indirectly; indirectly through the norms and social
expectations the individual has to follow, directly through the
expected ways of behavior which determine deviance. In an inter-
esting article Catherine Caldwell-Harris and Ayse Ayçiçegi formu-
lated a “personality-cultural clash hypothesis” according to which
there is a correlation between personality-style, cultural charac-
ter and mental health (Caldwell-Harris and Ayçiçegi, 2006). They
state that “[p]ersonality traits associated with psychopathology
will be most frequent in allocentrics living in an individualist
society, and in idiocentrics living in a collectivist society.” In col-
lectivist societies where strict rules of social behavior have to be
followed and social harmony is highly valued, people with an
idiocentric (extremely individualistic) personality tend to have
poorer mental health with high scores in paranoid, schizoid,
narcissistic, borderline, and antisocial PDs. In individualistic soci-
eties, by contrast, a distinct allocentric (extremely collectivist)
personality is positively correlated with social anxiety, depres-
sion, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and dependent personality.
In addition to this indirect influence on mental disorder, there
is a more direct influence, too. This can best be illustrated by
Wakefield’s account of cultural relativity:
“Whereas social phobia is a real disorder in which people can
sometimes not engage in the most routine social interaction,
current criteria allow diagnosis when someone is, say, intensely
anxious about public speaking in front of strangers. [. . . ] This
diagnosis seems potentially an expression of American society’s
high need for people who can engage in occupations that require
communicating to large groups.” (Wakefield, 2007, p. 154)
In sum, not only has the respective cultural setup an indirect
influence on mental health, it also tends to dictate the boundary
between the normal and the deviant on the basis of the expected
values and virtues of its members. In this respect the impact
Frontiers in Psychology | Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology September 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 611 | 6
Stier Normative preconditions for the assessment of mental disorder
of society on the concept of mental disorder is clearly norma-
tive. Whether the indirect influence, i.e., the personality-cultural
clash, turns out to be directly normative under the surface after
all remains an issue for further scrutiny.
Diagnosis
Culturally specific views on psychiatric problems are harder to
detect in our era of mass migration and globalization than in
earlier times with more stable national and cultural boundaries.
Nonetheless, important cultural differences regarding mental dis-
orders remain, to which I am only able to allude in the following.
What is more, the culturally formed experiences of psychic prob-
lems are not only to be considered on the patient’s side but
also on that of the practitioner, as Laurence Kirmayer points out
(Kirmayer, 2001). This has also been shown some years ago by
a study that compared the diagnostic patterns of American and
Japanese clinicians (Tseng et al., 1992).
Three points regarding psychiatric diagnoses should be
stressed here. Firstly, many mental disorders indeed really “exist”
in the sense that they are modes of experiencing oneself and
the world which are extraordinarily burdensome. Secondly, expe-
rience and behavior can only be understood against the back-
ground of other people’s behavior and experience. Social phobia,
for instance, presupposes a social surrounding not only because
it is the very object of the phobia but also because it consti-
tutes the basis of comparison against which a person assesses her
own experiences. Thirdly, since there are “real” disorders on the
one hand and dynamic social expectations on the other, it fol-
lows that the boundary between average and deviant behavior
cannot be but normative. This is not just due to epistemologi-
cal limits. Those boundaries simply do not exist by nature. What
should psychiatrists do who are in need of a boundary that does
not exist? They have to define it themselves (with the help of
their social community) and put up a sign that reads “Attention,
you are leaving the normal sector!” Seen in this light it is hardly
surprising that there appears to be an extreme variance of preva-
lence rates for, e.g., social anxiety disorder across cultures, ranging
from 0.2% in China and 7.9% in the US to 44.2% in rural areas
of Udmurtia, a Constituent Republic of the Russian Federation
(Hofmann et al., 2010, p. 118). Even if this spectrum should be
primarily due to differences in case finding methods and there is
in actual fact no “real difference in major psychiatric disorders
across cultures and societies” as Andrew Cheng assumes (Cheng,
2001), it nevertheless mirrors all the problems and dependencies
of psychiatric diagnosis and, hence, the impact of cultural and
other norms and values on it.
Experience
Are psychological problems all the same around the world? If
they are, science may be in a position to explain them on a
purely molecular level one day. Two very common examples shall
suffice at this point for an illustration that this is a vain hope.
First, it is well known—even though hotly debated—that depres-
sion in Asian societies is experienced more as bodily malaise by
the persons affected. The western counterpart of this “somati-
zation” is sometimes called a “psychologization” (cf. Kirmayer,
2001). The Vietnamese language, for example, does not even
have words for psychiatry, schizophrenia, and depression (Phan
and Silove, 1997). A similar striking cultural difference can be
found in the case of social anxiety. While in the western cul-
tural sphere this is connected with the fear of being harmed or
offended, in Japan and Korea people are in fear of harming or
offending others (taijin kyofusho). Admittedly, taijin kyofusho
is—along with other culture-specific disorders—at least men-
tioned in the DSM as well as in the ICD, but whether it is the
same social anxiety disorder as in the western world, maybe a
cultural-specific expression of it, or a disorder in its own right,
is still under debate (cf. Hofmann et al., 2010). If two psycho-
logical problems that are quite differently experienced by the
patients in different cultures get explained with one and the
same molecular configuration, does this not come down to a
Procrustean bed into which diagnoses are forced? Both expres-
sions of social anxiety arise from and are judged by social
norms.
Evaluation
As repeatedly mentioned in this article, whether a certain kind
of behavior or experience counts as deviant and (potentially)
as a psychological problem is often (even though not always)
due to specific socio-cultural expectations. Somebody who is
“dynamic” in one cultural region may be regarded as offen-
sive in another. Remember the abovementioned western girl
in rural Turkey (or the other way round). Here, expectations
of rationality, morality, harm and harming combine to a nor-
mative framework against the background of which behavior
is assessed and disorders are diagnosed. That does not mean
there are no culturally and normatively independent men-
tal disorders at all. But it would nevertheless be a fallacy to
deduce the thesis that norms do not play a significant role
in the assessment of mental disorder from their undisputed
existence.
ROUTES OF EXPLANATION
Three levels of observation are of particular relevance in psychi-
atry. These levels exist in other areas as well, but when it comes
to mental health and the concept of mental disorder, they have
particularly far-reaching implications. These are the explanatory
level, the phenomenal level, and the interventional level. Onemight
use “reflection” instead of “observation,” but since “reflection” is
in some sense too ambitious a word, associated with deep scrutiny
and deliberation, “observation” is more adequate, as will become
clear in the following.
Let’s begin with the explanatory level. Here we find all the tradi-
tional models of explanation such as the psychoanalytical (Freud),
the sane reaction model (Laing), the labeling model (Rosenhan),
the problems of living account (Szasz), the biopsychosocial model
(Engel), or the currently dominating medical model. It will make
a considerable difference if you claim with Szasz that mental dis-
eases just do not exist, assume with Rosenhan that it is largely a
matter of labels, or if you search for purely biological causes. Each
of these models of mental disorder constitutes a basic explana-
tory norm since there just is no higher level of objectivity from
which we could assess the validity of one explanatory account or
the other. Admittedly, we can (and do) use the effectiveness of an
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explanation and its respective therapies as a criterion, but whether
psychopharmacological means are the most effective ones is open
to debate even today. Hence, everything depends on questions of
the philosophy of science, ontology, causality and—on an even
deeper level—on the question of what constitutes an explanation.
On the phenomenal level, what kind of behavior or expe-
rience indicates a mental disorder depends on all the factors
discussed above. The phenomenal level is in itself independent
of a particular mode of (causal) explanation. Often it is just a
matter of tradition or even intuition. The important aspect is
that pathologic behavioral deviance is assessed through its “being
different.”
On the interventional levelmental disorders are seen in the per-
spective of therapy, i.e., a successful cure is already part of the
explanation of a particular disease.
The routes of explanation come into play when we ask where to
start in order to understand the nature of mental disorders. It is
an interesting phenomenon that we may come to quite different
results, depending on where we start. If we begin at the explana-
tory level, psychiatric disorders may disappear if we are followers
of Szasz, or turn out to be purely physical if we adhere to the med-
ical model. In the first case mental disorders cease to be, in the
second they cease to be mental. In the first case we do not need
a therapy, in the latter the therapy will probably be a pharmaco-
logical one. We will get similar “start-dependent” results with the
psychoanalytical or the biopsychosocial model. What is impor-
tant here is that what we assume on the explanatory level defines
what we believe on the other levels.
The same holds true for the other routes. If we start on the
level of interventions and make use of pharmacological therapies,
we will probably come to the conclusion that psychiatric disorders
are indeed something physical. In this case we are even in danger
of getting ourselves into a circle: Why are pharmacological ther-
apies indicated? Because psychiatric disorders are brain defects.
How can we know that psychiatric disorders are brain defects? We
can conclude this from the effects of our pharmacological thera-
pies (cf. Valenstein, 1998, p. 222). To give a third and last example:
If we believe some behavior to be strange and pathologic, we will
surely find a cause of it at the explanatory level. So we have come
full circle: Remember the quote from Szazs at the beginning, that
“being kind to one’s wife is not the sort of behavior to which we
want to assign a causal (psychiatric) explanation.”
EPILOGUE
The fact that our understanding of mental disorders is guided
by several kinds of norms does not mean that these disorders
do not exist. More precisely, on the one hand there is psycho-
logical suffering which can hardly be doubted in its existence,
relevance, and “realness.” On the other hand there are several
cases of mental “disorder” which clearly rest on direct and indi-
rect, open and covert normative assumptions. This has at least
two consequences. First, psychiatric disorders are not “out there”
and not to be understood as objectively discoverable entities that
can always be separated from each other. The boundaries between
normal and non-normal behavior and those between one dis-
ease category and the other are floating. Second, because of the
normative nature of psychiatry, mental disorders cannot be com-
pletely reduced to neuronal or molecular processes. Again, more
precisely: A mental state as such may well be reducible to the
brain, but determining whether this very mental state is (part of)
a disorder or not is nothing the brain sciences can do. Something
will always be lost in translation.
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